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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE
On June 29, 1971, Senator Gravel, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Buildings and Grounds, convened a meeting of that subcommittee. He
stated at the outset that the conduct of the United States in Indochina
was relevant to the purposes of his subcommittee because of its effects on
the domestic economy, specifically the lack of sufficient federal funds to
provide for adequate public facilities. He then read portions of the "Pen-
tagon Papers"' and included the documents in their entirety in the record
of the meeting. Subsequently, he entered into unsuccessful arrangements
for the publication of the record (for no personal, financial gain) by Bea-
con Press, a private, nonprofit publishing house.
A federal grand jury, convened in Boston to investigate matters relat-
ing to the public disclosure of the Pentagon Papers, subpoenaed Dr.
Rodberg, an aide to the Senator. Senator Gravel then moved to inter-
vene in an action brought by the aide to quash the subpoena. He con-
tended that the questioning of the aide would contravene the speech or,
debate clause of the Constitution.2  The motion to quash the subpoena
of the aide was denied, but a protective order was entered and affirmed
precluding questioning of the Senator or any member of his staff about
the subcommittee meeting, including the acquisition and subsequent pub-
lication of the Pentagon Papers.s The order was based on the privilege
of the legislator and his aide under the speech or debate clause, and on
a common law privilege akin to that accorded executive and judicial offi-
cials to protect them from liability for official conduct.
The United States petitioned for certiorari challenging: (1) the ruling
that aides and other persons may not be questioned with respect to legis-
1. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELA-
TIONs 1945-1967 (1971) (twelve volume edition condensing the original forty-seven
volumes for use of the House Committee on Armed Services', U.S. Government
Printing Office) (hereinafter referred to as the Pentagon Papers).
2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6: "The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the
Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony
and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other place." (Emphasis added).
3. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971); alfd, 455 F.2d
753 (lst Cir. 1972).
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lative acts; and (2) the ruling that an aide has a common law privilege
against testifying with respect to private republication of materials intro-
duced into a subcommittee meeting. 4 Senator Gravel petitioned for cer-
tiorari seeking reversal of the lower court decision insofar as: (1) it held
private republication to be unprotected by the speech or debate clause;
and (2) it too narrowly protected against inquiries that a grand jury could
direct to third parties.5 Both petitions were granted.
The Supreme Court held: (1) the speech or debate clause applies to
a member of Congress as well as to his aide, when the conduct of the aide
would be a protected legislative act if performed by the member himself;
(2) the speech or debate clause does not privilege the aide from testify-
ing before the grand jury concerning the alleged arrangement for private
publication of the Pentagon Papers because this publication was not part
of the legislative process; (3) the aide has no common law privilege from
being questioned by the grand jury about possible violations of federal
laws resulting from the alleged arrangement for private publication of
the Pentagon Papers; and (4) the aide could be questioned about the
source of classified documents in the Senator's possession as long as the
questioning implicated no legislative act.6 The lower court decision was
vacated and the case remanded with instructions to modify the protec-
tive order in accordance with the decision.
The decision in this case is significant because of the Court's determina-
tion of the activities which are entitled to the protection of the speech
or debate clause. The Court recognized the privileged nature of the leg-
islative committee meeting when it held that Senator Gravel and his aide
were privileged from inquiry with regard to activities performed therein,7
while it excluded from protection the publication of legislative proceed-
ings by a legislator when it held that a grand jury could question the Sen-
ator's aide concerning the alleged arrangements for publication.8 Finally,
the Court denied the protection of the clause to the gathering of informa-
tion in preparation for legislative action, by holding that the aide could
be questioned about the source of classified documents in the Senator's
possession.0 This casenote will explore the nature of the legislative proc-
4. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)
(No. 71-1026).
5. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972) (No. 71-1017).
6. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
7. Id. at 621.
8. Id. at 626-27.
9. Id. at 628.
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ess and the aspects of this process which are entitled to the protection of
the speech or debate clause. This exploration will reveal that the deci-
sion of the Court in the instant case represents a very restrictive view of
the legislative process, which the clause was intended to protect.
An early American case, Coffin v. Coffin,10 involved a defamation
suit by one state legislator against another for remarks made on the floor
of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. The Massachusetts con-
stitution contains a provision analogous to the speech or debate clause,
which the defendant pleaded as a defense." While holding that it was no
defense, the chief judge defined the privilege as follows:
I would define the article as securing to every member exemption from prosecution,
for everything said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the func-
tions of that office, without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to
the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules. I do not confine the mem-
ber to his place in the house: and I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is
entitled to the privilege, when not within the walls of the representatives' chamber.' 2
This early interpretation of the legislative privilege clearly recognized a
broad privilege for legislators in the performance of their functions.
The Coffin decision was quoted with approval in Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son,"1 an action for false imprisonment brought against the Speaker, mem-
bers and the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives. The
House had adjudged Kilbourn in contempt of Congress and ordered the
Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest him. The Court found that the House had
no authority to order the arrest of Kilbourn but that the members were
privileged by the clause.
In arriving at its decision, the Court considered the origins of the
clause in the English Bill of Rights and determined that the framers of
the Constitution had indicated their intent for the clause to have the
same meaning by using the same language. The Court defined the scope
of the clause stating:
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken in
debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports
presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in
writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is done
vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to things generally done in a ses-
sion of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it. 1 4
10. 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
11. See Oppenheim, Congressional Free Speech, 8 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 6 (1955),
for a listing of state constitutional provisions establishing the doctrine of legislative
privilege.
12. 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).
13. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
14. Id. at 204.
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Thus, the clause was viewed as flexible and applicable when a member
is engaged in legislative matters and not merely upon a static set of duties.
A legislator is not, however, protected by the clause when he commits
a crime. For example, the clause was not a defense for accepting bribes
in Burton v. United States,1" and for conspiracy to commit subornation
of perjury in Williamson v. United States,16 because these acts were held
to be outside the scope of the legislative process.
The clause protected a Senator against a defamation suit for words
spoken in the Senate during a speech, but totally unrelated to Senate
business, in Cochran v. Couzens.17 The court recognized the importance
of free speech in Congress when it stated:
It is manifest that the framers of the Constitution were of the view that it would best
serve the interests of all the people if members of the House and Senate were permit-
ted unlimited freedom in speeches or debates. The provision to that end is, there-
fore, grounded on public policy, and should be liberally construed. Presumably leg-
islators will be restrained in the exercise of such a privilege by the responsibilities of
their office. Moreover, in the event of their failure in that regard, they will be sub-
ject to discipline by their colleagues. i 8
The clause was interpreted as a guarantor of free discussion in the legis-
lature and, should any abuses result, the member is to be disciplined by
his peers. 19
The protection of the clause was determined to be a valid defense for
members of a California Senate investigating committee sued for viola-
tions of the Civil Rights Act by a witness. 20 The Court decided that the
claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege because
[i]nvestigations, whether by standing committees or special committees, are an es-
tablished part of representative government. Legislative committees have been
charged with losing sight of their duty of disinterestedness. In times of political
passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct
and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such controversies. Self-
discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting
such abuses. The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of determining
that a committee's inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province. 21
15. 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
16. 207 U.S. 425 (1908).
17. 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
18. Id. at 784.
19. See generally Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and
Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1910); Yankwich, The Immunity
of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960
(1951).
20. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
21. Id. at 377-78.
[Vol. XXII
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The Court recognized the importance of an investigating committee in re-
lation to the legislative process and decided that the judiciary should only
question the acts of such legislative committees in extreme cases.
In McGovern v. Martz2 2 the clause was interpreted as an absolute priv-
ilege against defamation when a Senator placed material containing de-
famatory subject matter in the Congressional Record. The court recog-
nized that the interchange of ideas and information could not be achieved
solely from debate on the floor of Congress but that congressmen must
be able to utilize the Congressional Record as a means of imparting and
acquiring necessary information.
Also, in United States v. Johnson,23 the clause's protection was broad-
ened to include the motives, purposes and ingredients of a congressman's
speech delivered in the House of Representatives. In this case an ex-
congressman was indicted for violating a federal conflict of interest stat-
ute and for conspiring to defraud the United States. The conspiracy
charge was based upon the government's theory that his speech in the
House of Representatives was delivered for the purpose of showing fa-
voritism to disreputable financial institutions and not for a valid legisla-
tive purpose. The prosecution conducted extensive investigations of the
congressman and his aides concerning the manner in which the speech
was prepared, its contents and his motives for delivering it. The Court
said that such an extensive judicial inquiry, made in the course of a prose-
cution by the executive branch, violated the express language of the Con-
stitution and the policies underlying it. 24  Furthermore, the Court deter-
mined that the clause serves another important function, namely that of
reinforcing the separation of powers:
The legislative privilege, protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly ex-
ecutive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the 'practical
security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature. 2 5
The chairman and counsel of a Senate investigating committee relied
upon the free speech or debate clause as a defense against a suit brought
by a citizen charging them with conspiring to seize his property in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. 26 The Court considered the purpose of
legislative immunity, stating:
22. 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960).
23. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
24. Id. at 177.
25. Id. at 179. See generally Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of
Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its past, present and future as a Bar to Criminal
Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFF. L. REv. 1 (1968).
26. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
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[]egislators engaged 'in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity' (citation omit-
ted) should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but
also from the burden of defending themselves. 2 7
In holding that the legislative privilege was applicable, the Court pointed
out that the right to immunity would not be applied as strictly when offi-
cers or employees of Congress rather than actual legislators are involved.
Although the privilege was not extended to the counsel in this case, it
was, significantly, seen to extend to aides.
The most recent case involving the clause was Powell v. McCormack
wherein an elected representative brought suit against the Speaker, mem-
bers and employees of the House of Representatives. 28 The members
had voted to exclude Adam Clayton Powell from his seat in the House
and the employees had denied him physical admission to the House and
other services. The Court dismissed the suit as to the members of the
House and stated:
Our cases make it clear that legislative immunity created by the Speech or Debate
Clause performs an important function in representative government. It insures that
legislators are free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that
they will be later called to task in the courts for that representation. 2 9
Although the petitioner was allowed to maintain the suit against the em-
ployees and to obtain judicial review of the resolution to exclude him,30
the Court determined that it was necessary for legislators to be shielded
from possible liability for their actions if they are to effectively function
as representatives of their constituents.
The interpretation of the speech or debate clause rendered by the
Court in Gravel v. United States that the protection of the clause now
extends to a legislator's aide when he is performing an act which would
be a protected legislative act if performed by the legislator, should have
a beneficial effect upon the manner in which the legislature conducts its
operations. The Court has recognized the necessity of a legislator having
competent assistants if he is to accomplish the numerous, complex tasks
with which he is charged.
The determination that the clause does not protect from grand jury
inquiry either Senator Gravel's alleged arrangements for private publica-
tion of the record of his subcommittee meeting containing the Pentagon
27. Id. at 85.
28. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
29. Id. at 503.
30. See generally Note, Legislative Power to Judge the Qualifications of its
Members, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1410 (1966); Rogers, The power of the Legislature to
Disqualify Members-Elect, 45 N.C.L. REv. 524 (1967).
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Papers, or the source of classified documents in the Senator's possession
represents a very restrictive interpretation of the legislative privilege. The
Court has removed the protection of the clause from two vital functions
of a legislator: (1) The publication of a legislator's work to inform his
constituents; and (2) the gathering of information to prepare for legisla-
tive acts.
The Court relied largely upon English cases for authority that there is
no privilege for publication by a legislator. The decision in Stockdale v.
Hansard3 1 was cited erroneously as supporting the contention that the
English legislative privilege did not permit publication and that this inter-
pretation was embodied in the speech or debate clause of the Constitution,
while the facts reveal that publication of parliamentary proceedings was
recognized as an important part of legislative activity. The attempt by
the Crown, for example, in Rex v. Williams to thwart the publication of
Dangerfield's Narrative by order of the Commons led to the inclusion
of article 9 in the English Bill of Rights to protect this activity. 3 2  In ad-
dition, the decision in Stockdale does not represent authority that a mem-
31. 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839). This case involved a libel suit against a
printer of the House of Commons. The House had ordered the publication of one
of its reports containing the libelous matter, and the printer contended that he was
protected by Parliamentary privilege. The court considered the privilege of mem-
bers of Parliament and stated: "By consequence, whatever is done within the walls
of either assembly must pass without question in any other place. For speeches
made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous
to public peace, that member enjoys complete immunity. For any paper signed by
the Speaker by order of the House, though to the last degree calumnious, or even
if it brought personal suffering upon individuals, the Speaker cannot be arraigned
in a Court of Justice." Id. at 1156. The court held that the printer was not covered
by the privilege which resulted in the enactment of the Parliamentary Papers Act,
1840, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 9, §§ I, II, to protect publishers of Parliamentary proceedings.
It is important to note that the S.ockdale case does not represent authority that a
member cannot publish his legislative woik under the legislative privilege because
the court did not consider this issue. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1880).
32. 13 How. St. Tr. 1370 (1816). This case involved the proceeding by James
11 against Sir William Williams, the Speaker of the Commons in 1686, who was
charged with seditious libel for publishing Dangerfield's Narrative by order of the
Commons. Dangerfield's Narrative was a report of an alleged plot between the
King and his relatives to restore Catholicism to England and to suppress Protestant-
ism. Sir Williams contended that his actions were protected by Parliamentary
privilege but he was found guilty and fined. In 1688, after James II went into
exile, the Commons appointed a committee to consider what action should be taken
to protect the liberties of the people and the independence of Parliament. The result
of their work was the Bill of Rights of 1689 containing article 9 which protected
speech and debate stating "that the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings
in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out
of Parliament." I W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2, art. 9 (1689). This provision was the
basis for the Speech or Debate Clause in the United States Constitution.
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ber is not privileged to publish his legislative work, but rather that a
printer is not protected if he publishes a report containing libelous mat-
ter. 33 Finally, Wason v. Walter34 held that a printer is privileged to print
accurate and good faith reports of parliamentary proceedings and that a
member may publish his speech for the information of his constitutents.
The Court in Gravel analyzed the activities performed by legislators
and defined those entitled to the protection of the clause when it stated:
[T]hey must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by
which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to
other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. 35
The Court then decided that private publication by Senator Gravel was
in no way essential to the deliberations of either House and concluded
that the arrangements for publication were, "not part and parcel of the
legislative process." 6  Since publication was not part of the legislative
process there was no immunity for the aide under the clause.
The majority decision that publication by Senator Gravel was not a
legislative function privileged by the clause was strongly disputed in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Douglas and
Marshall joined. Justice Brennan was concerned by the majority's narrow
scope of the legislative function when he stated:
Thus the Court excludes from the sphere of protected legislative activity a function
that I had supposed lay at the heart of our democratic system. I speak, of course, of
the legislator's duty to inform the public about matters affecting the administration
of government.37
Justice Brennan reasoned that this "informing function" of a legislator
is entitled to the protection of the clause and that, since Senator Gravel
was attempting to inform the public in arranging for publication of his
committee report, his conduct was privileged from inquiry by the grand
jury.
33. 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839).
34. L.R. 4 Q.B. 73, 95 (1868). This case involved a defamation suit against
the proprietor of the London Times who published a debate in which the plaintiff
was severely criticized. The court considered the Stockdale decision and criticized
it has having been very shortsighted because the judges involved had denied the
necessity and public advantage of having proceedings made public. The court
reasoned that the same principles upon which reports of judicial proceedings were
held privileged applied to reports of Parliamentary proceedings. If the publication
was accurate, and in good faith, it could not be the basis of a libel action. A
member of Parliament was also privileged to publish his speech for the information
of his constituents. Id. at 89.
35. 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
36. Id. at 625-26.
37. Id. at 648, 649 (Brennan J., dissenting).
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There is considerable authority to support this view of the informing
function of a legislator as an important part of the legislative process and
thus entitled to the protection of the clause. This function was recognized
by the framers of the Constitution. An early statement of their views
appears in the reaction of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to a 1797
case involving Samuel Cabell, a congressman from Virginia. Cabell had
sent newsletters to his constituents which were critical of the administra-
tion's policy in the war with France. When Cabell was subpoenaed be-
fore a federal grand jury, Jefferson drafted an essay condemning the in-
vasion of a legislator's privilege to communicate with his constituents.
The protest was joined by Madison and was sent to the Virginia House of
Delegates:
[i]n order to give to the will of the people the influence it ought to have, and the in-
formation which may enable them to exercise it usefully, it was part of the common
law, adopted as the law of this land, that their representatives, in the discharge of
their functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the coordinate
branches, Judiciary and Executive: and that their communications with their con-
stituents should of right, as of duty also, be free, full and unawed by any. .... 38
The importance of the informing function as an insurance that legisla-
tors represent their constituents was emphasized by James Wilson, one of
the 'drafters of the Constitution, when he stated that:
Representation is the chain of communication between the people and those to
whom they have committed this exercise of the powers of government. This chain
may consist of one or more links, but in all cases it should be sufficiently strong and
discernable. 39
In a speech before the Virginia Committee to ratify the Constitution,
Patrick Henry discussed the importance of the informing function as a
safeguard against arbitrary government when he stated:
Give us at least a plausible apology why Congress should keep their proceedings in
secret.,. They may carry on the most wicked and pernicious of schemes under
the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure
when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them. 40
The duty of a legislator to inform his constituents has been noted by nu-
merous constitutional scholars but perhaps Woodrow Wilson best de-
scribed it when he stated:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the
voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress has
and uses every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the
administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how
38. 8 Works of Thomas Jefferson 322 (Ford ed. 1904).
39. II Elliot's Debates 424 (1937).
40. III Elliot's Debates 169-70 (1937).
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it is being served .... The informing function of Congress should be preferred
even to its legislative function. 4 1
Wilson clearly recognized that Congress could not represent its constitu-
ents unless it communicated, through its members, with the public.
The informing function of a legislator also has been recognized in nu-
merous decisions which have referred to it as a vital part of the legisla-
tive process. In Tenney v. Brandhove, the Court held that members
of a legislative investigating committee were protected by the clause be-
cause this activity was a necessary part of the informing function.
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his pub-
lic trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should en-
joy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment
of everyone, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may give of-
fence. 4
2
The duty of Congress to conduct investigations into all areas of govern-
ment was seen as a vital part of the legislative process in Watkins v.
United States where the Court held:
[tihe power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative proc-
ess. That power is broad. . . . It comprehends probes into departments of the
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. 43
The Court clearly recognized that publication of the findings of legislative
investigations is a necessary concomitant to the effective performance of
the informing function. 44
The right of legislators to publish the reports of investigating commit-
tees was the basis of the court's refusal to grant an injunction against
members of the House of Representatives in Hentoff v. Ichord.45 The deci-
sion held that legislative activities were not limited to speech or debate
on the floor of Congress and, because the report involved matters of
public concern, the court would take no action to limit the use that the
members chose to make of it on or off the floor of Congress. These re-
ports are prepared and published in order to inform the public on topics
of vital importance so that they may express their opinions to their elected
representatives and participate in the actual legislative process. 46
There is further support for the informing function of a legislator when
41. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1885).
42. 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951); see also, Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
43. 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
44. Id. at 200, n.33 (emphasis added).
45. 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1970).
46. See, e.g., REPORT BY THE U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS (1968); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
(1970).
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the numerous privileges accorded to congressmen for the purpose of com-
municating with their constituents are considered. Congressmen are en-
titled to a free franking privilege on their letters; monetary allowances for
the use of the telephone or telegraph; monetary allotments for stationery;
and reduced rates on reprints of the Congressional Record. A careful
evaluation of the above data clearly reveals that the informing function of
a legislator is an integral part of the legislative process which the clause is
intended to protect. Senator Gravel's arrangement for private publica-
tion of his committee report containing the Pentagon Papers was a mani-
festation of that informing function and should have been protected by
the Court.
The majority in Gravel also decided that there was no constitutional
privilege or common law privilege that shielded the aide or any other wit-
ness from grand jury questions relevant to tracing the source of classified
documents that came into the Senator's possession as long as no legisla-
tive act was implicated by the questions. This decision, in effect, deter-
mined that information gathering by a legislator is not a part of the legis-
lative process and therefore is not entitled to the protection of the clause.
Justice Stewart was concerned with this issue when he dissented in
part:
[I]n preparing for legislative hearings, debates and roll calls, a member of Congress
obviously needs the broadest possible range of information. . . . Thus, the acquisi-
tion of knowledge through a promise of nondisclosure of its source will often be a
necessary concomitant of effective legislative conduct, if members of Congress are
properly to perform their constitutional duty.47
Justice Stewart reasoned that the information gathering process was es-
sential to the proper performance of a legislator's duties and was entitled
to the privilege of the clause.
Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall and Douglas joined dis-
senting, said of the information gathering process:
The receipt of materials for use in a congressional hearing is an integral part of the
preparation for that legislative act. . . . It would accomplish little toward the goal
of legislative freedom to exempt an official act from intimidating scrutiny, if other
conduct leading up to the act and intimately related to it could be deterred by a simi-
lar threat.48
Justice Brennan reasoned that the Senator and his aides should be privi-
leged from inquiry as to the source of the classified documents. He would
extend this privilege to any information which the Senator and his aide
might have as to the ultimate source of their information.
47. 408 U.S. 606, 630 (1972).
48. Id. at 648, 662-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The gathering of information has been recognized and upheld in the
numerous decisions extending the protection of the clause to legislative
investigating committees. These committees have served as a prime
source of gathering of information by legislators in preparation for future
legislative action. The members of a committee in Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son were protected from suit because the clause extends protection "to
things generally done in the session of the House by one of its members
in relation to the business before it."' 49  The legislators in Tenney v.
Brandhove were similarly privileged because "[i]nvestigations, whether
by standing committees or special committees, are an established part of
representative government."50
It is apparent from this precedent that information gathering is an in-
tegral part of the legislative process and that the action of Senator Gravel
in acquiring the classified documents for use in his subcommittee meet-
ing should have been protected from inquiry by the clause.
The speech or debate clause was included in the Constitution to insure
independence of the legislative branch of the government from interfer-
ence by the two coordinate branches. The clause was intended to pre-
vent inquiry into how the legislature exercises the functions delegated to it
by the Constitution. The decision in Gravel has threatened this safe-
guard by limiting its protection in accordance with the Court's view of
what the legislative process entails. The decision may have raised more
serious difficulties: Will a constitutional amendment be necessary to in-
sure the freedom of the legislature? Will the prospect of increased liabil-
ity for their actions cause legislators to hesitate in seeking out and expos-
ing corruption in government? Finally, will the relative ease, with which
the judicial branch has stripped away the constitutional protection of the
legislative branch, encourage it to attempt further incursions?
Mark A. Lies 11
49. 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
50. 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
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